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Abstract 
Amid rising political polarization, inaccurate memory for facts and exaggerated memories of 
grievances can drive individuals and groups further apart. We assessed whether people with 
more accurate memories of the facts concerning political events were less susceptible to bias 
when remembering how events made them feel. Study 1 assessed participants’ memories 
concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election (N = 571), and included 33 individuals with 
Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM). Study 2 assessed participants’ memories 
concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland (N = 733). Participants rated how happy, 
angry, and scared they felt days after these events. Six months later, they recalled their feelings 
and factual information. In both studies, participants overestimated how angry they had felt but 
underestimated happiness and fear. Adjusting for importance, no association was found between 
the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings. Accuracy in remembering facts was predicted by 
media exposure. Accuracy in remembering feelings was predicted by consistency over time in 
feelings and appraisals about past events. HSAM participants in Study 1 remembered election-
related facts better than others, but not their feelings. Thus, having a good grasp of the facts did 
not protect against bias in remembering feelings about political events. 
Keywords: emotion memory; event memory; politics; Highly Superior Autobiographical 
Memory 
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Remembering Facts versus Feelings in the Wake of Political Events 
Societies are becoming increasingly polarized as people stockpile memories of political 
achievements and grievances. These memories can be inaccurate. Conflicting accounts, fake 
news, and conspiracy theories sow confusion about even the most basic facts concerning political 
events (Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019; Finkel et al., 2020). People’s memories of their 
emotional response to political events are also prey to distortion (Levine, 1997). The relation 
between the accuracy of memory for facts and feelings is not known. Bringing to mind a 
detailed, accurate representation of a past political event may promote accuracy when people 
remember how that event made them feel. If so, those with a good grasp of the facts may be less 
prone to biases that deepen partisan divide such as exaggerating anger over past grievances (Yip 
& Schweitzer, 2019). Then again, different factors may promote accuracy in memory for facts 
and feelings, leaving the well-informed just as susceptible to misremembering their feelings as 
the ill-informed. The current investigation addressed these issues by examining predictors of 
accuracy in memories of facts and feelings in the wake of two highly-emotional political events: 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 Irish referendum concerning abortion.  
Predictors of Accuracy in Memory for Facts and Feelings 
Memory for facts refers to representations of details concerning a past external event – 
what happened, when and where it happened, who was involved. A key source of accuracy in 
memory for facts is importance. People pay close attention to, and encode details about, events 
they appraise to be important for achieving their goals (Conway, 2005; Levine & Edelstein, 
2009). They also seek out media reports and talk with others about important events (Rime, 
2009; Tinti et al., 2014). Inaccurate descriptions of events in media reports and conversations can 
lead people to develop false memories (Gabbert et al., 2004; Murphy et al., 2019). But to the 
extent that accounts are true, the repetition of details in media reports and conversations would 
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promote accurate memory for facts (Tinti et al., 2014). Thus, appraising events as important, 
media exposure, and rehearsal should be associated with greater accuracy in memory for factual 
information concerning political events. 
Memory for feelings refers to representations of details concerning people’s internal 
state, such as how intensely happy, angry, and scared they were. Accuracy matters here too 
because people’s memories of how past outcomes made them feel influence their decisions about 
how much effort to invest in promoting or preventing similar outcomes in the future (e.g., 
Kahneman et al., 1993). As with memory for facts, appraising events as important should be 
associated with accuracy in memory for feelings. Events that people appraise as important evoke 
intense emotion (Lench et al., 2011) and moments of peak emotional intensity are particularly 
memorable (Kahneman et al., 1993; Kaplan et al., 2016). Even when emotion is intense, 
however, episodic memory becomes less accessible and more subject to bias over time 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002). When people recall how an event made them feel, what comes to 
mind depends partly on their episodic memory of their initial emotional experience, and partly 
on their current appraisals and feelings about the event. The more their appraisals and feelings 
have changed over time, the greater the bias in memory for emotion (Kaplan et al., 2016).  
Providing a real-world example, Levine (1997) had supporters rate how hopeful and 
angry they felt when candidate Ross Perot unexpectedly withdrew from the U.S. presidential 
race in July of 1992. In November, after Perot had reentered the race, the same individuals 
recalled how they had felt. Memories of emotion were biased in the direction of participants’ 
current appraisals of Perot. Those who appraised Perot positively in November overestimated 
how hopeful they had felt when Perot dropped out of the race, and underestimated how angry 
they had felt. In contrast, those who had turned against Perot underestimated how hopeful they 
had felt and recalled the full force of their anger. Similarly, U.K. citizens’ memories of their 
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feelings about Brexit were predicted by their current appraisals and feelings about the outcome 
(Schmidt et al., 2021). These findings suggest that, as episodic memories of emotion fade, people 
draw on their current feelings and interpretations of past events to help them reconstruct how 
they must have felt. Those who have come to appraise an event as more or less important or 
favorable over time tend to misremember their emotional response as more consistent with their 
current feelings and appraisals than it actually was. Thus, the direction of bias in memory for 
emotion should depend on how people’s feelings and appraisals have changed over time.  
Certain changes in feelings and appraisals may be widely shared in the wake of complex 
political events, biasing memory for specific emotions. Importance and uncertainty decline as 
people accommodate to successes and defeats and as other life concerns take precedence (e.g., 
Wilson & Gilbert, 2008). These changes may lead people to underestimate past emotions, 
particularly fear which is elicited by uncertainty (Lench et al., 2011). As event details and 
complexity fade from memory over time, people may retain just the gist of how political 
outcomes thwarted their goals, leading them to overestimate anger, which is elicited by goal 
obstacles and motivates efforts to remove them (Lench et al., 2011; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). 
Thus, this study also explored the direction of bias in memory for specific emotions.   
The findings reviewed above suggest that, except for importance, the predictors of 
accuracy differ for memories of facts versus feelings. Media exposure and rehearsal should 
promote more accurate memory for facts. Consistency over time in people’s feelings about, and 
appraisals of events, should promote more accurate memory for feelings. But several models of 
flashbulb memory argue instead that memory for facts and feelings should be closely related. 
According to Brown and Kulik’s (1977) original definition of flashbulb memory, people’s 
feelings are part of the autobiographical context in which they learn about important public 
events. As such, feelings were one of the canonical categories of information expected to be 
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retained with near photographic accuracy. Since that early account, errors have been found to be 
common when people recount the circumstances in which they learned about highly-emotional 
public events (Hirst et al., 2015; Neisser & Harsh, 1992). Yet, several models of flashbulb 
memories maintain that, the more accurate an individual’s memory for the facts about an event, 
the better their memory will be for the autobiographical context in which they learned the news 
(Er, 2003; Luminet, 2009; Tinti et al., 2009; for an opposing view, see Muzzulini et al., 2020; 
Tinti et al., 2014). Drawing on accessible memories of facts (e.g., “the FBI Director made a 
negative announcement about my candidate days before the election”) may also allow people to 
accurately reconstruct how they felt (e.g., “I must have been really angry”). According to this 
view, people with detailed and accurate factual memories of significant public events should also 
remember how those events made them feel.  
Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory 
We had a unique opportunity to test these competing views in Study 1 by assessing 
memory for both facts and feelings in individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical 
Memory (HSAM). Individuals with HSAM remember personal and public events with 
remarkable detail and accuracy, including events that occurred decades ago (LePort et al., 2012, 
2016, 2017). Fewer than 100 people with HSAM have been identified worldwide based on 
extensive testing of their memories of verifiable public events, verifiable autobiographical events 
(e.g., recorded in diaries, weather reports), and the consistency of their memories over time 
(McGaugh, 2017). For example, LePort et al. (2012) gave participants with HSAM and age- and 
sex-matched controls 10 randomly-generated dates spanning decades. Participants were asked to 
describe a verifiable public event and an autobiographical event that occurred within ± one 
month of each date, and to indicate the day of the week. The overall score of people classified as 
having HSAM averaged 85% whereas the average was just 8.2% for controls.  
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Yet people with HSAM do not excel on all memory tasks. Their abilities are most evident 
when tested concerning events drawn directly from their own autobiographical experience and 
when tested after long retention intervals. In a series of experiments, participants with HSAM did 
not differ from control participants on laboratory tests of working memory or recognition of 
pictures or word lists (LePort et al., 2016). They also did not show superior memory for 
autobiographical events from the prior week. After delays of a month and longer, however, 
participants with HSAM retained those autobiographical memories in far greater detail than 
controls. These findings suggest that people with HSAM do not encode events differently from 
others. Instead, they appear to benefit from exceptionally efficient consolidation and retrieval of 
autobiographical events and closely associated public events (LePort et al., 2016).  
People with HSAM often describe their memories as full of emotion (e.g., Parker et al., 
2006), but only two studies have examined memory for emotion in this group (Levine et al., 
2020; Patihis et al., 2013). Neither study included a long retention interval, and the findings were 
mixed. Patihis et al. (2013) assessed the consistency of participants’ memories at two sessions, 
one week apart, for how they felt after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Compared to 
controls, participants with HSAM showed slightly greater consistency in their memory for 
emotions associated with low control (upset, distressed, sadness, grief) and no difference in the 
consistency of memory for emotions associated with high control (anger, frustration). Levine et 
al. (2020) found that participants with HSAM did not differ from controls in the accuracy with 
which they remembered their emotional response to Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election after three weeks. Because superior memory may only become apparent in 
people with HSAM after a longer retention interval, and recognition memory for facts 
concerning public events had not been tested in this group, we examined memory for facts and 
feelings concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election after six months. Thus, the current 
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investigation examined the relation between memory for facts and feelings concerning two 
political events in large, diverse groups of participants. Including individuals with HSAM in 
Study 1 provided an additional, novel way to assess whether better memory for facts concerning 
temporally distant events confers greater accuracy when remembering feelings about events.  
The Current Investigation  
This investigation was designed to advance understanding of memory for political 
experiences by addressing three questions: 1) What predicts accuracy in people’s memories of 
the facts and their feelings concerning political events? 2) What accounts for the direction of bias 
in memory for emotions? 3) Are people with more accurate memories of the facts concerning 
political events less susceptible to misremembering how events made them feel? Study 1 
assessed memories concerning the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and included 33 individuals 
with HSAM. Study 2 assessed memories concerning the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland. 
In both studies, participants rated how they felt days after the event and, six months later, they 
recalled their feelings and factual information. We chose to investigate memory for happiness, 
anger, and fear because these emotions are common responses to political outcomes (e.g., Pew 
Research Center, 2016).  
People who viewed events as more important were expected to have more accurate 
memory for both facts and feelings (e.g., Conway, 2005). With the exception of importance, 
however, we expected no association between memory for facts and feelings. We further 
expected the predictors of memory accuracy to differ for facts and feelings. Repetition of details 
via media exposure and rehearsal should promote accuracy in memories of facts but not feelings 
(Tinti et al., 2014). Consistency over time in participants’ feelings and appraisals of political 
events should promote accuracy in memories of feelings but not facts (Levine et al., 2020). 
Individuals with HSAM in Study 1 were expected to remember election-related facts, but not 
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their feelings, more accurately than the main group of participants.  
Study 1 
Method 
This study was part of a larger investigation of affective forecasting. Some variables in 
this study were included in publications that addressed different research questions. In a study 
discussed in the introduction, Levine et al. (2020) compared the vividness and accuracy of 
affective forecasts versus memories concerning the 2016 election across 3-week intervals. To 
assess accuracy, this study included the intensity of happiness, anger, and fear experienced days 
after the election, as well as valence, importance, age, sex, and ethnicity. These variables were 
also reported in a paper on bias in affective forecasts (Lench, Levine, Perez, Carpenter, et al., 
2019). A paper examining subjective well-being after the election included demographic 
information (Lench, Levine, Perez, Haggenmiller, et al., 2019). Only the current study assessed 
memory for emotions six months after the election and memory for facts. Data are available 
online: https://osf.io/er9hv/files/. 
Participants. Participants (N = 571) completed online questionnaires about two days 
after, and about six months after, the 2016 U.S. presidential election. As part of the larger 
investigation, 957 individuals completed online questionnaires three weeks before, days after, 
and three weeks after the election (Lench et al., 2019; Levine et al., 2020). Different groups were 
sampled to capture a range of political preferences. An a priori power computation for the 
difference between two dependent means (e.g., experienced and remembered emotion) gave a 
total sample size of 327 to have power of .95 to detect an effect size of .20. The current study 
included all participants who agreed to complete a follow-up questionnaire when contacted about 
6 months after the election. The sample included 407 U.S. participants recruited through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), 93 undergraduate students enrolled in a large public research 
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university in Texas, 38 participants enrolled in a large public research university in California, 
and 33 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory (HSAM).1 Of the sample, 
58% were women, the average age was 34.28 years (SD = 13.49, range = 18 to 70 years). 
Participants reported their ethnicity as White (73%), African American (8%), Hispanic (7%), 
East Asian (6%), South Asian (3%), or other (3%). Demographic information for each group of 
participants is available online at https://osf.io/er9hv/files/ in Supplemental Table S1.2  
The research was carried out in accordance with Institutional Review Boards (IRB) at the 
University of California, Irvine and Texas A&M University. The main group of participants was 
invited to participate through the Amazon Mechanical Turk system or university subject pools. 
We invited all 51 individuals with Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory to participate who 
had email addresses and had consented to participate in research at the University of California, 
Irvine. Participants with HSAM had been previously identified using a multi-step, IRB-approved 
process, at the University of California, Irvine.3 
Time 1 questionnaire: The week of the election. Participants completed an online 
questionnaire about 2 days after the election (November 9 - 14, M = 1.62 days, SD = 1.04). They 
rated how intensely happy, angry, and scared they were feeling about Donald Trump being 
elected president, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). To assess participants’ appraisal of the 
valence of the election outcome, we asked them to rate how much they agreed that, “It will be 
good for the country that Donald Trump was elected President” on a scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Participants also rated, “How important is the outcome of the 
2016 presidential election to you” from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (extremely important). To 
assess media exposure and rehearsal, participants were asked, over the last three days, how many 
hours they spent attending to media coverage concerning the election, and how many hours they 
spent talking with others about the election (0 to 72 hours). They also reported demographic 
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information, whether they voted and, if so, for whom.  
Time 2 questionnaire: Six months after the election. Participants completed a second 
online questionnaire slightly less than six months after the election (between April 21 and May 1, 
2017, hereafter referred to as six months for simplicity). They reported how intensely happy, 
angry, and scared they were currently feeling about Donald Trump being elected president, from 
1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Participants were also asked to remember how they had felt about 
Trump’s election days after the election. They were instructed, “One evening, during the week of 
November 8th, just days after the election, you completed a questionnaire about how you were 
feeling. In the next set of questions, please tell us how you remember having felt at that time.” 
Participants rated how intensely happy, angry, and scared they remembered having felt, using a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). Participants also reported their current appraisal of the 
importance of the election outcome, as at Time 1.  
Finally, participants completed 15 four-option, forced-choice questions that assessed their 
memory for events, facts, and dates concerning the election campaign (Cronbach’s α = .61). For 
example, participants were asked how Trump launched his campaign; on which congressman’s 
laptop did James Comey report finding new email pertinent to the investigation into Hillary 
Clinton's email use; and when the first presidential debate between Clinton and Trump took place 
(adapted from Walsh, 2016; see Appendix A for the complete list of questions).  
Measures and analyses. To provide an accuracy score for memory for facts, we 
calculated the percentage correct of the 15 factual questions. Following recommended practice 
(e.g., Roy et al., 2005), we assessed the accuracy of memory for emotion in two ways: We 
assessed overall accuracy by computing the degree of overlap between experienced and 
remembered emotion, independent of the direction of bias. We also assessed the direction of bias 
for each individual emotion – happiness, anger, and fear – by subtracting experienced emotion 
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from remembered emotion. Assessing overall accuracy is important because averaging the 
direction of memory bias across individuals masks the magnitude of inaccuracy if some people 
overestimate and others underestimate.  
To assess the overall accuracy of emotion memory, we first created composite indices of 
emotion. Using composite indices allowed us to compare, in a parsimonious way: (a) the factors 
that predicted overall memory accuracy for facts versus feelings, (b) the overall accuracy with 
which participants with HSAM versus the main group remembered their feelings, and (c) how 
participants’ feelings about the election outcome changed over time. Participants’ initial ratings 
of anger and fear were positively correlated (r = .77), and were negatively correlated with 
happiness (rs < -.66). Thus, as often done for parsimony (e.g., Kahneman & Krueger, 2006), we 
subtracted the mean rating of anger and fear from happiness to create three composite indices: 
Time 1 experienced emotion, Time 2 remembered emotion, and Time 2 current emotion. 
Composite indices ranged from -8 to 8, with higher ratings indicating a more positive response.  
Next, as our measure of overall accuracy, we computed the percentage of agreement 
between composite ratings of experienced and remembered emotion. The resulting measure was 
similar in sign (+/-) and format (percentage correct) to the accuracy measure for fact memory. 
Specifically, we calculated the absolute value of the difference between experienced and 
remembered emotion. We then transformed this measure of inaccuracy to indicate the proportion 
of agreement between experienced and remembered emotion: (1 −
|𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛|
16
), and multiplied the result by 100. Thus, identical 
ratings for experienced and remembered emotion yielded an accuracy score of 100%. Values of -
8 for experienced emotion and 8 for remembered emotion, or vice versa, yielded an accuracy 
score of 0%. Values of 2 for experienced emotion and 6 for remembered emotion yielded an 
accuracy score of 75%. Using this measure in analyses (e.g., z-tests, regression betas) gives 
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identical results to using the absolute value of the difference between experienced and 
remembered emotion, except that the +/- sign is reversed.  
The number of participants with HSAM was necessarily small, so we used non-
parametric, two-tailed, Mann-Whitney z-tests to compare them with the main group, which 
consisted of MTurk participants and students from California and Texas.  
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary analyses. Days after the election, participants indicated that they had voted 
for Trump (27%), Clinton (48%), another candidate (8%), or did not vote (13%); 4% did not 
indicate their vote. Trump voters strongly agreed that his election was good for the country (M = 
5.87, SD = 1.14) whereas those who did not vote for Trump strongly disagreed (M = 1.98, SD = 
1.42), t(569) = 30.47, p < .001, d = 2.77, 95% CImean diff [3.64, 4.14]. Indeed, agreement that 
Trump’s election was good for the country was significantly below the midpoint of the 7-point 
scale for participants who voted for Clinton (M = 1.49, SD = 0.89), another candidate (M = 2.77, 
SD = 1.49), did not vote (M = 3.16, SD = 1.88), and did not indicate their vote (M = 2.97, SD = 
1.85); all ts > 3.93, ps < .001. Therefore, we defined the valence of the election outcome as 
positive for Trump voters and as negative for participants who did not vote for Trump. 
At Time 1, participants reported many hours of election media exposure (M = 8.30 hours, 
SD = 6.75), and talking about the election (M = 4.71 hours, SD = 5.33), over the past three days. 
They appraised the election outcome as highly important days after the election (M = 7.24, SD = 
2.05), but as somewhat less important six months later (M = 6.86, SD = 2.22), t(563) = 5.68, p < 
.001, d = .18, 95% CI [0.25, 0.52]. Participants with HSAM did not differ from the main group 
in media exposure, rehearsal, or appraised importance (ps > .11).  
Memory for facts. We compared participants with HSAM to the main group with 
respect to the accuracy of their memory for facts concerning the election campaigns. Participants 
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with HSAM remembered facts more accurately (M = 61.82% correct, SD = 20.90, range = 
13.33% – 100%) than did the main group (M = 50.57% correct, SD = 17.20, range = 6.67% – 
100%), z = 3.35, p = .001, d = 0.28. Participants with HSAM also remembered facts more 
accurately than each subgroup: California students, Texas students, and MTurk participants (all 
ts > 2.81, ps < .006). However, this memory advantage was not extreme. In prior studies, relative 
to controls, individuals with HSAM showed far superior memory for temporally-distant 
autobiographical events (e.g., LePort et al., 2012, 2016). Participants with HSAM in the current 
study may have shown a smaller memory advantage because the facts they were asked to 
remember were only loosely linked to their personal autobiographies. 
To assess predictors of memory for facts, we conducted a regression analysis. The model 
included group (main group = 0, HSAM = 1), Time 1 appraisal of the importance of the election 
outcome, media exposure, rehearsal, and the valence of the election outcome (negative = 0, 
positive = 1). We also included overall change in appraised importance (the absolute value of the 
difference between Time 1 and Time 2 importance) and overall change in feelings about the 
election outcome (the absolute value of the difference between Time 1 emotion and Time 2 
current emotion); lower values represent greater consistency. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics 
and correlations among memory for facts, memory for feelings, and all model variables. Table 2 
shows the results of the regression analysis. 
As Table 2 (Panel A) shows, the model was significant. Variance inflation values ranged 
from 1.04 to 1.60, indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern. More accurate memory for 
facts was predicted by having HSAM, by appraising the election outcome as more important, and 
by media exposure. With media exposure included in the model, talking more about the election 
was actually negatively associated with accurate memory for facts. Memory for facts was not 
significantly predicted by valence or by change in participants’ appraisals or feelings concerning 
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the election outcome. A follow-up regression analysis showed that no variable interacted with 
HSAM status to predict memory for facts (ts < 1.58, ps > .11). 
Memory for feelings: Overall accuracy. Next, we assessed the overall accuracy with 
which participants remembered their emotional response to the election. That is, independent of 
the direction of bias, how much overlap was there between experienced and remembered 
emotion? Consistent with past research, participants remembered the intensity of emotion they 
had experienced with high accuracy (e.g., Kaplan et al., 2016). The accuracy of memory for 
emotion did not differ significantly for participants with HSAM (M = 91.57%, SD = 8.57, range 
= 62.50 – 100%) and the main group (M = 90.90%, SD = 9.87%, range = 28.13 – 100%), z = 
0.26, p = .79, d = .02. Indeed, HSAM participants and the main group did not differ on any 
measure of emotion. Specifically, the intensity of emotion experienced the week after the 
election did not differ (HSAM: M = -1.42, SD = 4.60; main group: M = -1.34, SD = 5.42), z = -
0.18, p = .86, d = .02. The intensity of emotion remembered six months later did not differ 
(HSAM: M = -1.80, SD = 4.89; main group: M = -1.48, SD = 5.37), z = -0.18, p = .85, d = .02. 
Current feelings about the election outcome after six months also did not differ (HSAM: M = -
1.05, SD = 4.66; main group: M = -1.10, SD = 4.71), z = 0.05, p = .96, d = .002. Follow-up 
analyses of each emotion, happiness, anger, and fear, also showed no group differences in 
experienced, remembered or current emotion, or memory accuracy (zs < 1.05, ps > .14).  
Although the overall accuracy of memory for emotion was high when averaged across 
participants, this does not mean that memories were accurate for individual participants. Indeed, 
41% of participants remembered a more negative emotional response than they experienced, 
37% remembered a more positive emotional response, and 22% remembered the same emotional 
response. We conducted further analyses to explain this variation.  
To assess predictors of overall accuracy in memory for emotion, we conducted the same 
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regression analysis as for fact memory. As Table 2 (Panel B) shows, the model was significant. 
Participants who appraised the election outcome as more important remembered their emotional 
response more accurately. In addition, the less importance changed over time, the more 
accurately participants remembered their emotional response. The less participants’ current 
feelings about the election changed over time, the more accurately they remembered their initial 
emotional response. HSAM status, media exposure, and rehearsal were not significant predictors 
of overall accuracy in memory for emotion. Thus, as anticipated, no overlap except for initial 
importance was found between the predictors of overall accuracy in memory for facts and 
feelings. Moreover, despite the low correlation shown in Table 1, a partial correlation that 
adjusted for Time 1 appraised importance showed no significant association between memory for 
facts and feelings, r(568) = .06, p = .14.4    
Memory for feelings: Direction of bias. We also examined the direction of bias in 
memory for specific emotions. We conducted a mixed model ANOVA with emotion (happy, 
angry, scared) and time (Time 1 experience, Time 2 memory) as within subject variables, and 
with valence (voted for Trump, did not vote for Trump) as the between subject variable. The 
results showed significant effects of valence, F(1, 569) = 55.92, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09, emotion, F(1, 
569) = 26.59, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and their interaction, F(1, 569) = 785.34, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .58. As 
Figure 1 shows, not surprisingly, Trump voters experienced and remembered feeling happier 
than those who did not vote for Trump. Participants who did not vote for Trump experienced and 
remembered more anger and fear. An interaction between time and emotion was also found, F(2, 
569) = 11.46, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.02. As a group, participants underestimated in recalling happiness 
(Mean difference = -0.17), t(571) = -3.18, p = .002, d = .06, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.07], and fear (Mdiff 
= -0.30), t(571) = -3.89, p < .001, d = .10, 95% CI [-0.46, -0.15], but overestimated in recalling 
anger (Mdiff = 0.28), t(571) = 3.49, p < .001, d = .09, 95% CI [0.12, 0.44].  
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Predictors of the direction of bias in memory for feelings. What might account for 
these differing biases in memory for discrete emotions? Inconsistency between participants’ 
initial and current feelings about the election outcome was the strongest predictor of overall 
inaccuracy in memory for emotion (Table 2, Panel B). We conducted a repeated measures 
ANCOVA to find out whether change in current feelings predicted the direction of bias in 
memory for happiness, anger, and fear. Memory bias was defined as remembered minus 
experienced emotion for happiness, anger, and fear, thus positive values indicate overestimation, 
zero indicates no bias, and negative values indicate underestimation. Change in current feelings 
was defined as the difference between the composite measure of current emotion six months 
after, versus days after, the election (M = 0.23, SD = 2.67, range = -15 to 9.5). The model 
included the same covariates as prior models of overall accuracy: group (HSAM, main group), 
Time 1 appraised importance, media exposure, rehearsal, valence, and change in appraised 
importance.  
The results showed a main effect of change in feelings, F(1, 545) = 68.95, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.11, and an interaction between emotion and change in feelings, F(2, 1090) = 200.66, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 =.27. Figure 2 depicts this interaction. The figure shows predicted values for memory bias, 
adjusted for covariates, with shaded error bands indicating 95% confidence intervals. Change in 
current feelings is shown from 1 SD below 0 (feelings became more negative over time) to 1 SD 
above 0 (feelings became more positive). As Figure 2 shows, the more negative participants 
came to feel about the election outcome, the more they overestimated in remembering how angry 
and scared they had initially felt, and underestimated happiness. Overestimation was more 
pronounced for anger than fear. Participants whose feelings about the election outcome had not 
changed after six months showed little bias. The more positive participants came to feel about 
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the election outcome, the more they underestimated in remembering how angry and scared they 
had felt and overestimated happiness.  
Significant effects, with much smaller effect sizes, were also found for some covariates. 
The results showed a main effect of valence, F(1, 545) = 18.54, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and an 
interaction between valence and emotion, F(2, 1090) = 27.12, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.05. Participants 
who viewed Trump’s victory as negative overestimated anger more than those who viewed it as 
positive (Mdiff  = 0.38), t(570) = 2.11, p = .04, d = .20, 95% CI [0.03, 0.73], whereas bias in 
memory for happiness and fear did not differ by valence (ts < 0.86, ps > .39). Media exposure 
was associated with greater bias (overestimation) in remembering discrete emotions, F(1, 545) = 
5.09, p = .03, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.01. In contrast, media exposure predicted greater accuracy in memory for 
facts (see Table 2, Panel A). Finally, rehearsal did not predict the direction of memory bias for 
any emotion individually but a main effect of rehearsal, with a small effect size, was found such 
that talking more about the election outcome was associated with overestimation, F(1, 545) = 
4.36, p = .04, 𝜂𝑝
2 =.008. In comparison, rehearsal predicted less accurate memory for facts, and 
was not associated with overall memory accuracy for feelings (see Table 2, Panels A & B). 
 Discussion. In summary, only the importance of the election outcome predicted overall 
memory accuracy for both facts and feelings. After adjusting for importance, no association 
between overall memory accuracy for facts and feelings was found. Participants with HSAM 
remembered election-related facts, but not their feelings, better than others. Accuracy in memory 
for facts was also predicted by media exposure. In contrast, overall accuracy in memory for 
feelings was predicted by greater consistency over time in participants’ feelings about, and the 
appraised importance of, the election outcome. With respect to memory for specific emotions, 
the magnitude and direction of bias was strongly related to how an individual’s feelings about 
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the election changed over time. As a group, however, participants overestimated how angry they 
had felt but underestimated how scared and happy they had felt.  
 In Study 2, we assessed whether these findings would hold for a different political event 
and type of memory assessment. We investigated memory for facts and feelings concerning the 
2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland. This study assessed recall, rather than recognition, of 
facts. Finally, whereas Study 1 assessed memory for facts and feelings concerning different 
aspects of the election (facts about the campaigns, feelings about the election outcome), Study 2 
assessed memory for both facts and feelings concerning the referendum outcome.  
Study 2 
Study 2 focused on the 2018 referendum on abortion in the Republic of Ireland. The 
referendum was held on whether to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that stated 
that ‘the unborn’ had a right to life equal to that of the mother. This amendment meant that 
Ireland had some of the strictest abortion laws in the world, with abortion only permitted in cases 
of substantial risk to the life of the mother (Taylor, 2015). Voters could vote Yes (to repeal the 
8th amendment) or No (to retain the amendment and keep abortion restricted). The Yes side won 
a landslide victory with 66% voting to repeal (Bohan, 2018).  
This study was part of a larger investigation of false memory that followed participants 
for 12 months after the referendum. Some variables reported in the current study were included 
in publications that addressed different research questions. Specifically, a study of false 
memories of fake news reports a week before the referendum included participant age (Murphy 
et al., 2019). A study of the effectiveness of debriefing in false memory studies included age, 
sex, vote, importance, media exposure, and rehearsal (Murphy et al., 2020a). These variables 
were also included in a study of voter’s memories of the reasons for their vote (Murphy et al., 
2020b). Only the current study assessed memory for emotions and memory for facts about the 
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outcome of the referendum. Data are available online: https://osf.io/er9hv/files/. 
Methods 
 Participants. An initial sample of 1009 individuals completed online questionnaires in 
both June and November of 2018. An a priori power analysis conducted as part of the larger 
investigation (Murphy et al., 2019) showed that a sample of 260 participants was needed to 
detect the smallest effect size reported in similar investigations (e.g., memory accuracy in groups 
with differing political orientations). The current study included all participants (N = 733) who 
responded to questions concerning memory for both facts and feelings of happiness, anger, and 
fear. Participants were recruited via university student emails and via social media posts and 
articles in TheJournal.ie (an Irish news website). They ranged in age from 18 to 82 years (M = 
36.81 years, SD = 12.34). Participants reported their sex as female (71%), male (28%), other or 
declined to answer (1%). Although recruitment targeted voters who wanted to retain the 
amendment restricting abortion as well as voters who wanted to repeal it, 91% of the respondents 
who completed memory questions at both time points favored repeal (for more details 
concerning recruitment, see Murphy et al., 2019). 
 Time 1 questionnaire: The week after the referendum. The referendum took place on 
May 25, 2018. The results of two exit polls were released that evening, and the result of the vote 
was announced the next day. The Time 1 questionnaire was emailed on May 30, 2018 and 
completed during the week following the referendum. Participants were asked how they had 
voted, and could select “I voted Yes”, “I didn’t vote but would have voted Yes”, “I voted No”, “I 
didn’t vote but would have voted No”, “I didn’t vote and wasn’t leaning either way”, or “I’d 
prefer not to say”. Participants rated how much they had followed media coverage, and talked 
about the referendum outcome, since the result was announced, from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a great 
deal). They rated, “How important was the referendum to you?” from 1 (not at all important) to 
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9 (extremely important). They also rated how intensely happy, angry, and scared they were 
feeling about the referendum outcome, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
Time 2 questionnaire: Six months after the referendum. In November of 2018, about 
six months after the referendum, participants were emailed an invitation to complete a follow-up 
questionnaire. They were asked to remember how they felt the week after the referendum: 
“Think back to about a week after the 8th amendment referendum, after it had passed. How were 
you feeling about the result at that time? How intensely did you feel [happy / angry / scared]?” 
Participants rated their remembered feelings from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).  
To assess memory for facts, participants responded to eight open-ended questions about 
the referendum outcome (e.g., Who conducted the two exit polls? What percentage of the 
country voted to repeal the 8th amendment?) (Cronbach’s α = .67). Several questions focused on 
two exit polls released the evening of the vote. This was done because these large-sample polls 
revealed that a strong majority had voted to repeal the restrictive amendment. The poll results 
were widely known and discussed in the media before the formal results were released. 
Questions and scoring are shown in Appendix B. Correctly answering all eight questions yielded 
a score of seven points (two questions were related and had a maximum score of 0.5 points 
each). Responses to the fact memory questions for all participants were coded independently by 
two research assistants (kappa ranged from .84 to .99 for the 8 questions, M = .95). 
Discrepancies were resolved by a third coder. 
Participants then rated how happy, angry, and scared they were currently feeling about 
the referendum outcome, from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). They also rated the current 
importance of the referendum outcome, from 1 (not at all important) to 9 (extremely important).  
Measures and analyses. To provide an accuracy score for fact memory, we calculated 
the percentage of points received out of seven, the total points possible. As in Study 1, we 
MEMORY FOR FACTS AND FEELINGS   22 
 
examined both the overall accuracy of memory for emotion and the direction of bias in memory 
for happiness, anger, and fear. Initial ratings of anger and fear were positively correlated (r = 
.58), and were negatively correlated with happiness (rs < -.42). Thus, we subtracted the mean of 
anger and fear from happiness to create three composite indices of emotion: Time 1 experienced 
emotion, Time 2 remembered emotion, and Time 2 current emotion. These emotion indices 
ranged from -8 to 8, with higher ratings indicating a more positive response. To provide an 
overall accuracy score for emotion memory, we calculated the percentage of agreement between 
experienced and remembered emotion, as in Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analyses. The majority of participants voted “yes” to repeal the amendment 
restricting abortion (n = 624) or indicated that they would have voted “yes” (n = 41). Few voted 
“no” to retain the amendment (n = 62) or indicated that they would have voted “no” (n = 5), or “I 
didn’t vote and wasn’t leaning either way” (n = 1). We defined the valence of the referendum 
outcome as positive for participants who voted, or would have voted, “yes” (91%), and as 
negative for participants who voted, or would have voted, “no” (9%). The week after the 
referendum, participants reported exposure to media coverage (M = 3.56, SD = 1.10) and talking 
with others (M = 3.53, SD = 1.03) about the outcome, using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (a 
great deal). Participants appraised the referendum outcome as extremely important the week 
after it was announced (M = 7.82, SD = 1.37), using a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), 
and appraised importance had not decreased significantly six months later (M = 7.79, SD = 1.55), 
t(724) = 0.84, p = .40, d = .02, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.11].  
Memory for facts. We conducted a regression analysis to assess predictors of accuracy 
in memory for facts. As in Study 1, the model included Time 1 appraised importance, media 
exposure, rehearsal, the valence of the referendum outcome, overall change in appraised 
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importance, and overall change in feelings about the referendum outcome. Table 3 shows 
descriptive statistics and correlations among memory for events, memory for emotion, and 
variables in the model. Table 4 shows the results of the regression analysis. As Table 4 (Panel A) 
shows, the model was significant. Variance inflation factor values ranged from 1.04 to 1.71, 
indicating that multicollinearity was not a concern. More accurate memory for events was 
predicted only by media exposure and rehearsal.  
 Memory for feelings: Overall accuracy. We also examined memory for feelings about 
the referendum outcome, and the results were very similar to those found in Study 1. We first 
conducted a regression analysis to assess predictors of overall accuracy in memory for emotion. 
This analysis included the same predictors as in the analysis of memory for facts. As Table 4 
(Panel B) shows, the model was significant. The less participants’ feelings about the referendum 
changed over time, the more accurately they remembered their initial emotional response. In 
addition, positive valence predicted greater overall accuracy. The simple profile of emotions 
experienced by those who favored the referendum outcome (intense happiness and very little 
anger or fear; see Figure 3) may have been easier to remember. No other variable predicted the 
accuracy of memory for emotion. Importantly, as Table 3 shows, there was no significant 
association between overall memory accuracy for facts and feelings.5  
Memory for feelings: Direction of bias. To examine the direction of memory bias for 
discrete emotions, we conducted a mixed model ANOVA with emotion (happy, angry, scared) 
and time (Time 1 experience, Time 2 memory) as within subject variables, and with valence as 
the between subject variable. The results showed a main effect of emotion, F(2, 1462) = 223.91, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .23, and interactions between emotion and valence, F(2, 1462) = 1211.63, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .62, emotion and time, F(2, 1462) = 32.16, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04, and emotion, valence, 
and time, F(2, 1462) = 22.10, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03.  
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As Figure 3 shows, not surprisingly, participants for whom the referendum outcome was 
positive experienced and recalled more happiness, whereas participants for whom the outcome 
was negative experienced and recalled more anger and fear. Participants overestimated how 
angry they had felt regardless of whether they viewed the referendum outcome as positive (Mdiff  
= 0.24), t(664) = 5.26, p < .001, d = .23, 95% CI [0.15, 0.33], or negative (Mdiff  = 0.62), t(67) = 
2.29, p = .02, d = .23, 95% CI [0.08, 1.15]. Participants who favored the outcome underestimated 
how happy they had felt (Mdiff = -0.11), t(664) = -2.20, p = .03, d = .08, 95% CI [-0.20, -0.01], 
whereas, those who viewed it as negative showed no significant bias in memory for happiness 
(Mdiff  = 0.22), t(67) = 1.11, p = .27, d = .15, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.62]. Participants who favored the 
outcome showed no bias in memory for fear (Mdiff  = 0.01), t(664) = 0.13, p = .90, d = .01, 95% 
CI [-0.09, 0.10], whereas those who viewed it as negative underestimated fear (Mdiff  = -0.93), 
t(67) = -3.38, p = .001, d = .34, 95% CI [-1.47, -0.38]. In summary, this pattern of bias was 
similar to that found in Study 1. Participants overestimated how angry they had felt regardless of 
valence. They underestimated how happy they had felt about a positive outcome and how scared 
they had felt about a negative outcome. 
Predictors of the direction of bias in memory for feelings. Finally, as in Study 1, we 
conducted a repeated measures ANCOVA to find out whether change in current feelings about 
the referendum outcome predicted the direction of bias in memory for happiness, anger, and fear. 
As a reminder, change in current feelings was defined as the difference between the composite 
measure of current emotion six months after, versus days after, the referendum (M = -0.32, SD = 
1.95, range = -11 to 9.5). The covariates were Time 1 appraised importance, media exposure, 
rehearsal, valence, and change in appraised importance.  
The results were again similar to Study 1. Memory bias was predicted by emotion, F(2, 
1424) = 11.96, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .02, change in feelings, F(1, 712) = 10.50, p = .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .01, and 
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their interaction, F(2, 1424) = 162.38, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .19. As Figure 4 shows, the more negative 
participants came to feel about the referendum outcome, the more they overestimated in 
remembering how angry and scared they had initially felt and underestimated happiness. 
Participants whose feelings about the referendum had not changed after six months showed little 
bias. The more positive participants came to feel about the referendum outcome, the more they 
underestimated in remembering how angry and scared they had felt and overestimated happiness. 
With respect to covariates, an interaction between valence and emotion was found, F(2, 1424) = 
18.92, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03. As can be seen in Figure 3, participants who viewed the referendum 
outcome as negative overestimated anger more, and underestimated fear more, than participants 
who viewed it as positive. Bias in memory for happiness did not differ by valence.  
General Discussion 
Hazy memory for facts and exaggerated memories of grievances can inflame political 
debate, driving individuals and groups apart (Yip & Schweitzer, 2019). But are factual memories 
of past encounters the antidote to misremembering feelings? This investigation examined 
predictors of accuracy in people’s memories of facts and feelings concerning the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election and the 2018 referendum on abortion in Ireland. The results were strikingly 
similar across these two highly-emotional political events despite differing political outcomes, 
countries, and historical backgrounds. In both studies, participants as a group overestimated how 
angry they had felt about negative outcomes. They underestimated both how scared they had felt 
about negative outcomes and how happy they had felt about positive outcomes. More accurate 
memory of the facts concerning political events did not protect against these biases in memory 
for feelings.  
People remember important experiences better than mundane ones, including what 
happened (Conway, 2005) and how they felt about it (Kaplan et al., 2016). But adjusting for 
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appraised importance in Study 1, no association was found between the accuracy of memory for 
facts and feelings in either study. Moreover, predictors of overall memory accuracy differed for 
facts and feelings. More accurate memory for facts was predicted by media exposure in both 
studies, and by talking with others about the referendum outcome in Study 2. Media accounts 
and conversations may scaffold people’s memories by reiterating factual information about 
political events. In contrast, people must draw on their own autobiographical memories and 
current experience when remembering how events made them feel (Tinti et al., 2014). In keeping 
with this view, participants whose feelings and appraisals of past events remained more 
consistent over time remembered their past feelings more accurately.  
Specifically, on average, participants remembered the intensity of their emotional 
response to political outcomes fairly accurately in both studies (Kaplan et al., 2016). 
Nonetheless, the majority of individual participants over- or underestimated in remembering 
their initial feelings of happiness, anger, and fear. Change in current feelings about political 
outcomes predicted the direction of bias in memory for discrete emotions. In Study 1, change in 
participants’ appraisals of the importance of Trump’s victory also predicted overall inaccuracy in 
memory for emotion. (In Study 2, the importance of the referendum outcome had not decreased 
after six months.) These findings suggest that memory biases result when people have salient, 
competing emotional experience and appraisals at the time of recall. Consistency in emotions 
and appraisals allows people to retrieve more accurate memories of their past emotional 
experience. Even after memories of emotion have faded, drawing on consistent current feelings 
and appraisals may allow people to correctly reconstruct how they felt in the past (Levine et al., 
2020; Robinson & Clore, 2002).  
Study 1 also included a unique approach to assessing whether accurate memory for 
events protects again bias in remembering emotion. We examined memory for election-related 
MEMORY FOR FACTS AND FEELINGS   27 
 
facts and feelings in individuals with HSAM. These individuals had previously been tested and 
shown to have extraordinarily detailed and accurate memories of public and personal events – a 
memory advantage that was most evident after retention intervals of a month or longer (LePort et 
al., 2016, 2017). Emotion is an important part of autobiographical experience, but memory for 
emotion over a lengthy retention interval, and recognition memory for facts, had never been 
tested in this group. We found that, after six months, participants with HSAM remembered facts 
concerning the election better than other participants but did not differ in the accuracy with 
which they remembered their feelings. In past research, people who showed greater accuracy on 
one false memory task were no less susceptible than others to false memories on other tasks 
(e.g., Patihis et al., 2018). Similarly, individuals with HSAM were not immune to bias in 
memory for emotion (Patihis et al., 2018; Levine et al., 2020), even after a lengthy delay.  
Participants with HSAM remembered election-related facts significantly more accurately 
than other participants despite not differing in the appraised importance of the election outcome, 
the intensity of initial emotion, media exposure, or rehearsal. Yet it must be noted that their 
memory for facts was not strikingly superior to that of the main group. This may be because the 
facts assessed were not closely linked to their autobiographical experience. For example, on the 
10 Dates Quiz (LePort et al., 2012), participants chose a public event to describe which had 
occurred ± one month of the dates supplied by investigators. The performance of individuals 
with HSAM on this and similar tasks was many standard deviations above that of control 
participants (LePort et al., 2016, 2017). Notably, the details of public events that participants 
recounted (except for the date and day of the week) were selected by participants and may have 
been associated with events of importance in their own lives. LePort et al. (2016) tested the 
memories of participants with HSAM and controls for details from their own lives and details 
that the experimenter had shared about her life. Participants with HSAM showed no memory 
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advantage for details concerning the experimenter’s life though many had worked with her for 
years. Similarly, the facts that participants were asked to remember about the 2016 campaigns 
may not have been closely associated with autobiographical events for participants with HSAM.  
Taken together, the current findings refine our understanding of the abilities and the 
limitations of a unique group and highlight differences between remembering facts and feelings. 
Although their primary memory advantage lies in storing and retrieving their own 
autobiographical histories (LePort et al., 2016), we found that individuals with HSAM also 
remember facts about public events significantly better than others. Yet, greater accuracy in 
remembering events did not confer an advantage when remembering how events made them feel, 
either for HSAM participants or for the main group of participants. 
Limitations of this investigation should be noted. We found that the accuracy of emotion 
memories was predicted by consistency over time in people’s feelings and appraisals concerning 
political events. This finding extends to emotion memories concerning other types of events 
(e.g., academic achievements, health complaints; Levine et al., 2012; Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
In contrast, greater overestimation of anger than other emotions is not always found (e.g., Levine 
et al., 2012) and may reflect rising political polarization. To explain why participants as a group 
overestimated anger and underestimated fear and happiness, future studies should assess changes 
in the particular appraisals that differentiate among these emotions, such as certainty/uncertainty, 
control/powerlessness, and responsibility (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). In addition, the correlational 
nature of the data limits causal conclusions. In Study 1, nonparametric tests were used to 
compare memory accuracy across groups due to the necessarily small number of participants 
with HSAM. Although, not a focus of this investigation, the small number of “No voters” in 
Study 2 may have limited our ability to detect differences in memory accuracy between voters 
who favored retaining versus repealing the restrictive amendment. Finally, future research should 
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assess the consequences of biases in emotion memory for political decisions and ways to reduce 
susceptibility to bias in memory for anger. 
In conclusion, following two dissimilar political events, people exaggerated their past 
anger and underestimated happiness and fear, effectively stripping nuance from their memories 
of emotional experience. Having an accurate grasp of the facts did not protect people against 
misremembering their feelings. Reconstruction is a functional feature of memory that allows 
learning and aids decision making (Schacter, 2012). But in the context of increasing political 
polarization, misremembering emotion can be detrimental. Norms of tolerance and moderation 
are eroding in many societies worldwide (Carothers & O’Donohue, 2019). We found that, when 
people recalled past grievances in the context of current negative feelings, they overestimated 
how angry they were. In turn, bringing to mind exaggerated past feelings of anger can lead 
people to downplay risks, overlook commonalities across groups, and seek out confrontation, 
making the current context even more negative (Yip & Schweitzer, 2019). Thus, memory bias 
can both stem from and stoke animosity, a destructive cycle of political polarization.   
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Footnotes 
 1All but three of the 33 participants with HSAM were U.S. citizens. These three 
participants also rated the U.S. election as important, and omitting them did not change any 
findings in the paper, so all HSAM participants were included.  
2The questionnaires in Study 1 were brief and did not include attention check questions. 
However, as part of a larger project on affective forecasting (Levine et al., 2020), Study 1 
participants had completed a 60-minute questionnaire weeks before the election which included 
two attention check questions. Attention check scores ranged from 0 to 2 correct (M = 1.78, SD = 
0.59), and are reported for each subgroup of participants in Supplemental Table S1. Most 
participants (87%) passed both attention checks, and another 4% passed one check, suggesting 
that the overall quality of participation was high. 
3Fewer than 100 people with HSAM have been identified but the actual number of 
individuals with this ability is not known. A case study (Parker et al., 2006) and media reports 
sparked public awareness of HSAM. People who contacted the researchers claiming to have 
HSAM underwent two screening procedures (LePort et al., 2012). In the Public Events Quiz, 
they were asked to provide the date and day of the week when prompted with significant public 
events that occurred during their lifetime, and to provide the significant public event and day of 
the week when prompted with dates. Those who scored 50% correct or more were given the 10 
Dates Quiz. They were asked to describe a verifiable public event, and an autobiographical 
event, that occurred within ± one month of 10 randomly generated dates, and to indicate the day 
of the week for all events. Researchers classified those who scored 65% or above as having 
HSAM (for a more detailed description of screening, see LePort et al., 2012). 
4In Study 1, we also conducted separate regression analyses assessing the predictors of 
overall memory accuracy for happiness, anger, and fear. Results were very similar to those 
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reported in the text for the composite measure of emotion. Namely, the strongest predictor of 
overall memory accuracy for all three emotions was consistency over time in current feelings 
about the election. Appraised importance predicted overall memory accuracy for happiness and 
anger (as found for the composite measure) but not fear. Change in appraised importance 
predicted overall memory accuracy for happiness and fear (as found for the composite measure) 
but not anger. In addition, participants who voted for Trump remembered anger more accurately, 
likely because they experienced very little anger. Results for discrete emotions are available 
online at https://osf.io/er9hv/files/ in Supplemental Table S2. 
5In Study 2, we also conducted separate regression analyses assessing the predictors of 
overall memory accuracy for happiness, anger, and fear. Significant predictors were identical to 
those reported for the composite measure of emotion, except that overall accuracy in 
remembering happiness was not predicted by valence. Results are available online in 
Supplemental Table S3: https://osf.io/er9hv/files/. 
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Appendix A: Study 1 Fact Memory Questions, Answers (in italics), and Scoring 
The final set of questions concerns events leading up to the 2016 presidential election. Please 
answer each question as best you can without consulting any outside sources. 
 
1. How did Donald Trump launch his presidential campaign? 
a. During an episode of The Apprentice 
b. He rode down an escalator into the lobby of a skyscraper bearing his name 
c. Via a series of tweets 
d. While traveling over Washington in a private jet 
 
2. How many Republican candidates were there in total? 
a. 10 b. 13 
c. 17 d. 21 
 
3. Who formally announced his own presidential bid by saying: "This grotesque level of 
inequality is immoral. It is bad economics. It is unsustainable. This type of rigged economy is 
not what America supposed to be about." 
a. Donald Trump b. Ben Carson 
c. Bernie Sanders d. Rand Paul 
 
4. Who was the Libertarian party candidate? 
a. Gary Jackson     b. Gary Johnson     
c. Gary Jefferson     d. Gary Anderson 
 
5. When did the first Democratic primary debate occur? 
a. September 29, 2015 b. October 13, 2015 
c. October 20, 2015 d. November 3, 2015 
 
6. Who were the Democratic and Republican winners of the Iowa caucuses? 
a. Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump b. Bernie Sanders and Ted Cruz 
c. Hillary Clinton and Ted Cruz d. Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump 
 
7. Clinton was attacked by Bernie Sanders for making millions of dollars in speeches to private 
groups or companies after leaving office as Secretary of State in 2013. What was Clinton's 
standard fee? 
a. $75,000     b. $150,000     
c. $225,000     d. $400,000 
 
8. When did the first Republican primary debate occur? 
a. August 6, 2015 b. August 20, 2015 
c. September 3, 2015 d. September 17, 2015 
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9. Trump said, "You wouldn't want me to condemn a group that I know nothing about. I'd have 
to look. If you would send me a list of the groups, I will do research on them and certainly I 
would disavow if I thought there was something wrong." What group was Trump talking 
about? 
a. American Nazi Party b. Ku Klux Klan     
c. Golden Dawn   d. Front National 
 
10. Sanders fought on against Clinton until late June. How many delegates did he win in total? 
a. 1,247     b. 1,463     
c. 1,893 d. 2,128 
 
11. Trump's nomination as official Republican candidate at the GOP convention was 
overshadowed by a controversial speech by Trump's wife Melania Trump. Whose 2008 
speech was she accused of plagiarizing? 
a. Hillary Clinton's b. Gabrielle Giffords's     
c. Elizabeth Warren's     d. Michelle Obama's 
 
12. When was the first presidential debate between Clinton and Trump? 
a. August 8, 2016 b. August 22, 2016 
c. September 12, 2016 d. September 26, 2016 
 
13. Clinton came under fire for a speech in which she claimed 'half' of Trump's supporters are 
'racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, islamophobic -- you name it.' How did she describe 
them? 
a. The hatbox of depravity b. The cave of unacceptability 
c. The underbelly of evil d. The basket of deplorables 
 
14. Which website did Clinton's team dub a "propaganda arm of the Russian government" after 
the sit released a slew of hacked emails from Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta? 
a. Russia Today b. Wikileaks 
c. 4chan d. Pravda 
  
15. A late October surprise came when James Comey told Congress the FBI had found new 
email that 'may be pertinent' to a previously closed investigation into Hillary Clinton's email 
use. The messages were found on the laptop of which former congressman? 
a. Tom Delay b. Mark Foley 
c. John Edwards d. Anthony Weiner 
 
 
Scoring: 1 point per correct answer. Maximum = 15 
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Appendix B: Study 2 Fact Memory Questions, Answers, and Scoring 
Question and answer Scoring (Maximum = 7) 
1. Who conducted the two exit polls?1 
 Poll 1: the polling company Ipsos 
MRBI for the Irish Times. Poll 2: the 
polling company Behaviour and 
Attitudes for RTE television, released 
on the Late Show 
 
0.5 points for any mention of Irish Times, 
MRBI or Ipsos (including misspellings) 
0.5 points for any mention of Late Show, 
RTE or Behaviour & Attitudes 
0.25 point penalty for any other polling 
company/newspaper/TV channel. Maximum 
penalty 0.5 points 
2. Which exit poll was released first? (who conducted it?) 
 Irish Times/IPSOS/MRBI 0.5 points for mention of Irish 
Times/IPSOS/MRBI. No negative marking 
3. When were the results of that first exit poll released? (please provide a day and time) 
 Friday, 10:00 to 10.30pm  1 point for any time between 10 and 10.30pm 
Friday. No negative marking 
4. Which exit poll was released second? (who conducted it?) 
 Late Late/RTE/Behaviour & Attitudes 0.5 points for mention of Late 
Late/RTE/Behaviour & Attitudes. No 
negative marking 
5. When were the results of the second exit poll released? (please provide a day and time) 
 Friday, 11:30 to midnight 1 point for any time between 11.30pm and 
midnight Friday 
6. In the final tally, what was the voter turnout rate (%) across the whole country? 
 64.13% 1 point for between 64% and 65%  
7. What percentage of the country voted to repeal the 8th amendment (voted Yes)? 
 66.4%  1 point for between 66 and 67%  
8. Name any constituencies in which the majority voted No. 
 Donegal  
 
1 point for Donegal. 0.5 point penalty for 
mention of any other constituency. Maximum 
penalty: 1 point 
Note. For questions with two parts (e.g. Question 1), participants received 0.5 points for correct 
responses to each part. Questions 2 and 4 were related, thus, correct responses yielded 0.5 points 
each. Penalties were deducted so participants could not receive full credit for listing all possible 
answers (e.g. Question 8). For Questions 6 and 7, we specified a narrow interval for correct 
responses because these percentages were widely discussed in Irish media. Scoring responses to 
these questions using continuous scales did not alter the pattern or significance of any results 
reported in the text. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Regression Models in Study 1 (N = 571) 
Variables   M   (SD)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Fact memory accuracy 51.22% 17.20          
2. Emotion memory accuracy 90.94%  9.80   .10*        
3. Group (Main=0, HSAM=1)  0.06  0.23   .15***  .02       
4. Importance (Time 1)  7.24  2.05   .28***  .15*** -.04      
5. Media exposure (Time 1)  8.30  6.75   .31***  .13** -.00  .38***     
6. Rehearsal (Time 1)  4.71  5.33   .09*  .07  .07  .26***  .54***    
7. Valence (neg=0, pos=1)  0.27  0.44   .08*  .07 -.06  .10*  .13**  .01   
8. Overall change in importance  1.01  1.30  -.16*** -.27***  .01 -.23*** -.17*** -.10*  .01  
9. Overall change in feelings  1.91  1.88  -.08 -.50*** -.04 -.02 -.02  .06 -.04  .17*** 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 2 
Linear Regressions Predicting the Accuracy of Memory for Facts and Feelings about the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election in Study 1 
 A. Memory for facts B. Memory for feelings 
Variable    β        B       SE B     t       β        B  SE B       t 
Group (Main = 0, HSAM = 1)  .16 11.85 2.88   4.11***  .00  0.06 1.53    0.04 
Appraised importance (Time 1)  .19         1.58 0.36   4.41***  .08  0.38 0.19   1.99* 
Media exposure (Time 1)  .29  0.74 0.12   5.92***  .05  0.07 0.07   1.07 
Rehearsal (Time 1) -.14 -0.45 0.15 -2.96**  .03  0.05 0.08   0.61 
Valence (neg = 0, pos = 1) .04 1.40 1.54   0.91  .03  0.68 0.81   0.84 
Overall change in importance -.08 -1.03 0.55 -1.89 -.16 -1.22 0.29  -4.22*** 
Overall change in feelings -.03 -0.27 0.36 -0.76 -.46 -2.39 0.19 -12.50*** 
      R2 and F values        R2 = .17, F(7, 552) = 15.89, p < .001 R2 = .29, F(7, 552) = 31.65, p < .001 
Note. Memory for facts refers to the percentage of correct responses to 15 four-option, forced choice questions. Memory for feelings 
refers to the percentage of agreement between experienced and remembered emotion.    *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Variables in Regression Models in Study 2 (N = 734) 
Variables      M   (SD)  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Fact memory accuracy 39.77% 25.16         
2. Emotion memory accuracy 92.38%  7.63   .06       
3. Importance (Time 1)  7.82  1.37   .19***  .11**      
4. Media exposure (Time 1)  3.56  1.10   .36***  .10**  .36***     
5. Rehearsal (Time 1)  3.53  1.03   .30***  .10**  .41***  .62***    
6. Valence (neg = 0, pos = 1)  0.91  0.29   .08*  .19***  .11**  .16***  .10**   
7. Overall change in importance  0.60  0.87  -.15*** -.09* -.44*** -.17*** -.21*** -.13***  
8. Overall change in feelings 1.30  1.49  -.01 -.41*** -.05 -.05 -.02 -.12***  .03 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
  




Linear Regressions Predicting the Accuracy of Memory for Facts and Feelings concerning the Referendum in Study 2 
 
 A. Memory for facts B. Memory for feelings 
Variable    β B SE B     t β   B  SE B       t 
Appraised importance (Time 1)  .02 0.34 0.77   0.44  .04  0.20 0.23    0.90 
Media exposure (Time 1)  .26 5.88 1.03   5.72***  .01  0.08 0.30    0.25 
Rehearsal (Time 1)  .10 2.57 1.11   2.30*  .05  0.37 0.33    1.13 
Valence (neg = 0, pos = 1) .02 1.46 3.04   0.48 .14  3.60 0.91    3.96*** 
Overall change in importance -.07 -1.96 1.12 -1.75 -.03 -0.27 0.33   -0.82 
Overall change in feelings -.04 -0.84 0.78 -1.03 -.38 -1.98 0.17 -11.33*** 
     R2 and F values        R2 = .14, F(6, 721) = 19.15, p < .001 R2 = .20, F(6, 718) = 28.76, p < .001 
 
Note. Memory for facts refers to the percentage correct out of a total possible score of 7 for responses to free recall questions. Memory 
for feelings refers to the percentage of agreement between experienced and remembered emotion.  *p < .05. ***p < .001. 
 




Mean Intensities of Experienced and Remembered Emotions concerning the Outcome of the 2016 
U. S. Presidential Election by Valence in Study 1
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Bias in Memory for Discrete Emotions as a Function of Change Over Time in Current Feelings 
about the Election Outcome in Study 1 
 
 
Note. Change over time in current feelings about the election outcome predicted the magnitude 
and direction of bias in memory for discrete emotions. Memory bias refers to remembered minus 
experienced emotion, for happiness, anger, and fear. Change in current feelings refers to the 
difference between the composite measure of current emotion six months after, versus days after, 
the election. Predicted values for memory bias, adjusted for covariates, are shown for 1 SD 
below 0 (feelings became more negative), 0 (no change), and 1 SD above 0 (feelings became 
more positive). Shaded error bands show 95% confidence intervals for predicted values. 




Mean Intensities of Experienced and Remembered Emotions concerning the Referendum on 
Abortion in Ireland by Valence in Study 2 
 
Note. The valence of the referendum outcome was defined as positive for participants who 
indicated that they voted, or would have voted, “yes” to repeal the restrictive amendment, and as 
negative for participants who indicated that they voted, or would have voted, “no” to retain the 
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Figure 4 
Bias in Memory for Discrete Emotions as a Function of Change Over Time in Current Feelings 
about the Referendum Outcome in Study 2 
 
 
Note. Change over time in current feelings about the referendum outcome predicted the 
magnitude and direction of bias in memory for discrete emotions. Memory bias refers to 
remembered minus experienced emotion, for happiness, anger, and fear. Change in current 
feelings refers to the difference between the composite measure of current emotion six months 
after, versus days after, the referendum. Predicted values for memory bias, adjusted for 
covariates, are shown for 1 SD below 0 (feelings became more negative), 0 (no change), and 1 
SD above 0 (feelings became more positive). Shaded error bands show 95% confidence intervals 
for predicted values. 




Supplemental Table S1 
 
Demographic Characteristics and Political Preferences of Participants in Study 1 
 
 HSAM MTurk CA student TX student 
Demographics     
n 33         407       38         93 
Men                   25         191         4          17 
Women 7        213       32         76 
Other or missing             1             3           2             0 
Age: Mean (SD)  42.19 (12.25) 38.47 (12.09) 21.29 (4.67) 18.54 (0.93) 
Black 1 44 0 1 
East Asian 1 18 10 5 
Hispanic 0 14 9 16 
Middle Eastern 1 1 4 1 
South Asian 2 3 4 6 
White 27 317 10 59 
Other or missing 1 10 1 5 
Political preferences     
Voted for Trump 15% 27% 0% 42% 
Voted for Clinton 58% 53% 56% 19% 
Voted for other   9% 8% 5% 5% 
Did not vote 9% 11% 18% 23% 
Did not report vote 9% 1% 21% 11% 
Importance of election 6.94 (2.31) 7.46 (1.99) 7.03 (2.07) 6.49 (2.07) 
Media exposure (hours) 8.30 (6.14) 9.02 (7.24) 7.16 (5.70) 5.63 (3.80) 
Rehearsal (hours) 6.18 (6.78) 4.59 (5.47) 5.18 (5.14) 4.52 (4.05) 
Attention check score1 1.56 (0.72) 1.96 (0.24) 1.32 (0.93) 1.28 (0.94) 
Note. 1Three weeks before the election, as part of a larger study on affective forecasting (Lench 
et al., 2019; Levine et al., 2020), participants completed two attention check questions embedded 
in a 60-minute online questionnaire. The attention check score ranged from 0 to 2 correct. 
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Supplemental Table S2 
Linear Regressions Predicting the Overall Accuracy of Memory for Happy, Angry, and Scared Feelings about the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election in 
Study 1 
 Happy Angry Scared 
Variable       β      B    SE B       t      β   B  SE B      t     β    B   SE B      t 
Group (Main = 0, HSAM = 1) -.01 -.88 2.02  -0.44 .04 2.94 2.93   1.00 -.02 -1.13 2.69  -0.42 
Appraised importance (T1) .14 .94 .25   3.70*** .10 .93 .37   2.52* .05 .40 .33   1.21 
Media exposure (Time 1) .03 .06 .09   0.68 .01 .03 .13   0.24 .05 .13 .12   1.09 
Rehearsal (Time 1) -.02 -.04 .11  -0.42 .01 .03 .16   0.20 .04 .14 .14   0.98 
Valence (neg = 0, pos = 1) -.00 -.04 1.11  -0.03 .13 5.34 1.65   3.23** .01 .35 1.46   0.24 
Change in importance -.07 -.81 .38  -2.13* -.06 -.82 .55  -1.49 -.13 -1.73 .51  -3.40*** 
Change in feelings -.58 -6.47 .39 -16.59*** -.46 -4.82 .41 -11.66*** -.52 -5.57 .40 -14.05*** 
      R2 and F values R2 = .41, F(7, 553) = 53.60, p < .001 R2 = .28, F(7, 552) = 30.29, p < .001 R2 = .32, F(7, 553) = 36.88, p < .001 
Note. Overall accuracy refers to the percentage of agreement between experienced and remembered emotion. Change in feelings, for the three 
regression analyses, refers to the absolute value of the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 current feelings of happiness, anger, or fear, 
respectively. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
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Supplemental Table S3 
Linear Regressions Predicting the Overall Accuracy of Memory for Happy, Angry, and Scared Feelings about the 2018 Irish Referendum on 
Abortion in Study 2 
 Happy Angry Scared 
Variable       β      B    SE B       t      β   B  SE B      t     β    B   SE B      t 
Appraised importance (T1) 
.06 .49 .35   1.38 .02 .27 .42   0.63 .01 .11 .38   0.29 
Media exposure (Time 1) 
.01 .06 .47   0.14 .04 .51 .57   0.90 .01 .17 .51   0.34 
Rehearsal (Time 1) 
.06 .66 .51   1.30 -.02 -.30 .62  -0.49 .01 .16 .55   0.29 
Valence (neg = 0, pos = 1) 
.04 1.67 1.39   1.21 .14 6.89 1.77   3.90*** .14 6.94 1.55   4.48*** 
Change in importance 
-.05 -.62 .51  -1.22 .04 .65 .62   1.05 -.03 -.47 .56  -0.85 
Change in feelings 
-.38 -3.97 .36 -11.09*** -.43 -4.98 .39 -12.76*** -.57 -6.34 .34 -18.64*** 
      R2 and F values R2 = .19, F(6, 721) = 27.14, p < .001 R2 = .24, F(6, 719) = 37.86, p < .001 R2 = .38, F(6, 720) = 73.05, p < .001 
Note. Overall accuracy refers to the percentage of agreement between experienced and remembered emotion. Change in feelings, for the three 
regression analyses, refers to the absolute value of the difference between Time 1 and Time 2 current feelings of happiness, anger, or fear, 
respectively. 
***p < .001. 
